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ABSTRACT Tworecentlysubmitted(butasyetunpublished)studiesdescribesuccessincreatingmutantisolatesofH5N1inﬂu-
enzaAvirusthatcanbetransmittedviatherespiratoryroutebetweenferrets;concernhasbeenraisedregardinghuman-to-
humantransmissibilityoftheseorsimilarlaboratory-generatedinﬂuenzaviruses.Furthermore,thepotentialreleaseofmethods
usedinthesestudieshasengenderedagreatdealofcontroversyaroundpublishingpotentialdual-usedataandalsohasservedas
acatalystfordebatesaroundthetruecase-fatalityrateofH5N1inﬂuenzaandthecapabilityofinﬂuenzavaccinesandantivirals
toimpactanyfutureunintentionalorintentionalreleaseofH5N1virus.Inthisreport,wereviewavailableseroepidemiology
dataforH5N1infectionanddiscusshowcase-ﬁndingstrategiesmayinﬂuencetheoverallcase-fatalityratereportedbythe
WHO.WealsoprovideinformationsupportingthepositionthatifanH5N1inﬂuenzapandemicoccurred,availablemedical
countermeasureswouldhavelimitedimpactontheassociatedmorbidityandmortality.
L
ife science is currently at a critical crossroads. Two recently
submitted manuscripts to Science and Nature raise serious
questions regarding research censorship and a grave concern for
global biosecurity, biosafety, and public health. These two studies
describe success in creating mutant isolates of H5N1 inﬂuenza A
virus that can be transmitted via the respiratory route between
ferrets. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(NSABB)wasaskedbytheU.S.governmenttoassessthedual-use
research implications of these manuscripts. The NSABB review
concluded that a signiﬁcant potential for harm existed in fully
publishing the methods and results; thus, the NSABB recom-
mended that details of the work not be fully communicated in an
open forum (1, 2). However, the World Health Organization
(WHO) has stated a preference from a public health perspective
for full disclosure of the information in these two studies (3).
The recommendation from the NSABB has resulted in a ﬂurry
of commentaries regarding both the merits and ﬂaws of this deci-
sion(4–15).Therehavebeencallsfor“solidscienceandnotspec-
ulation” and for decisions to be based on “sound scientiﬁc prin-
ciples” (12, 14). Some of these same commentaries have provided
selective data, not the entire body of published literature, to ad-
dress speciﬁc issues related to the NSABB decision (12, 14). The
issuesare(i)thedeterminationofthehumancase-fatalityratefor
H5N1infectionanditsimplicationforafuturepossiblepandemic
and (ii) the capability of our current inﬂuenza vaccines to impact
any future unintentional or intentional release of H5N1 virus.
H5N1 VIRUS INFECTION CASE-FATALITY RATE
The WHO reports that 345 of the conﬁrmed 584 cases of human
H5N1infectionhavedied;thecumulativecase-fatalityrateis59%
and ranges from 30 to 80% depending on the country (16). One
group of investigators recently concluded that “the case-fatality
rate that is offered by the WHO, and that is driving this contro-
versy, is likely orders of magnitude too high” (14). Their conclu-
sionwasbasedon10publishedstudiesofH5N1seroepidemiology
in potentially exposed persons. The WHO has established criteria
for the serologic identiﬁcation of H5N1 in humans (17). Using
literature search strategies similar to those of a previous review of
H5N1 seroepidemiology (18), we identiﬁed 24 studies published
to date that evaluate the seroepidemiology of H5N1infection in
humans (19–42). This analysis includes three follow-up studies
related to the 1997 outbreak of H5N1 inﬂuenza in Hong Kong;
therefore, we excluded those three studies from further analysis
sincecurrentH5N1virusesarenotsimilartothestrainthatcaused
thatoutbreak(43).Thisisconsistentwiththeﬁndingsandactions
of the WHO: the 1997 cases are not currently included in the case
count for H5N1 infections, and the 1997 isolate is not recom-
mended for inclusion in current H5N1 vaccines (16, 44). The
remaining21studieswereconductedandpublishedafter2004;13
meettheWHOcriteriaforserologicconﬁrmation(titerof1:80)
(19, 24, 26, 27, 33–41). Three of the 13 studies reported serologic
evidence of H5N1 infection (24, 39, 41). In total, 26 (0.47%) of
5,487 participants in these studies were seropositive for H5N1.
All 13 studies that used the WHO serologic screening criteria
were conducted within 4 months of the occurrence of human
H5N1casesorwithin6monthsofH5N1poultryoutbreaksinthe
area from which participants were enrolled. The timing of the
participant surveys maximized the possibility that these studies
would detect recent H5N1 infections had they occurred (45).
Mostoftheindividualstestedwereexposedtosickpoultryand/or
a symptomatic human case of H5N1 infection.
One seroepidemiology study of H5N1 infection in Thai villag-
ersconductedbyKhuntiratetal.(29)hasbeencitedasdocumen-
tation of an increased rate of H5N1 subclinical infections(12, 14).
In that study, approximately 6% and 3.5% of participants were
reported to have elevated antibody levels to one of two H5N1
viruses,respectively.Serologicsampleswereobtainedfromvillag-
ers more than 2 years after sporadic H5N1 outbreaks were re-
ported in poultry and one conﬁrmed and two possible human
H5N1 cases occurred in the area. This study was not included in
the 13 studies detailed above because serologic results did not
meet the WHO criteria for serologic conﬁrmation; the investiga-
tors used a low threshold antibody titer (1:10) as evidence of
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alowthresholdcouldleadtooverestimationofthetrueseropreva-
lence because of the increased likelihood of false-positive results
(46,47).Inaddition,thestudywasnotinitiateduntil2yearsafter
H5N1 infections in humans or poultry had been reported in the
area.
Of the 13 studies that used the WHO criteria, ﬁve reported the
rangeofserologictitersdetected(26,27,33,34,37).Thesestudies
were conducted within 4 months of the occurrence of human
cases and within 6 months of poultry outbreaks. The ﬁve studies,
whichincluded2,629participants,foundthatnoparticipantshad
evidence of previous infection based on the WHO criteria for se-
rologic conﬁrmation and only 13 (0.49%) had neutralization ti-
ters between 1:10 and 1:40. One study documented that most
participants had detectable H5N1 titers below 1:80; however, a
reevaluation of the dilutions used in the study led the authors to
conclude that these serologic titers did not represent detectable
antibody (33; J. Katz, personal communication). The results of
these ﬁve studies, which involved sampling of participants more
contemporary to evidence of circulating H5N1 viruses than the
study by Khuntirat et al., demonstrated at least a 10-fold-lower
prevalence of intermediate serologic results (i.e., neutralization
titers between 1:10 and 1:40) than to those found in the latter
study. We believe that these data support the concern regarding
false-positive results in the Khuntirat et al. study (29).
Some researchers have stated that, because of the speciﬁcity of
the WHO case deﬁnition, milder or asymptomatic H5N1 cases
havebeenmissedbytraditionalcase-basedsurveillanceandthere-
foreasmallfractionofthetotalnumberofinfectedcaseshasbeen
accountedforundertheWHOsurveillancesystem(12,14).When
population-based seroepidemiology studies are used to supple-
ment clinical-based surveillance, a more complete picture of the
epidemiology of that infection is generated than that by use of
clinicalcase-basedsurveillancealone.Mildorasymptomaticcases
can be detected by serologic evidence of prior infection even if
such cases are missed by traditional surveillance at the time of
their infection. Another case detection strategy is to follow ex-
posed persons over time to identify any inﬂuenza-like illnesses in
such groups. Exposed persons can include persons with known
exposure to conﬁrmed or suspected human H5N1 cases, persons
withoccupationalorhouseholdexposuretosickbirds,orpersons
living in the same locations as human and/or avian cases. Periods
of observation of exposed persons by health authorities have
lasted for up to 6 months. To date, this type of targeted surveil-
lance has not uncovered additional cases of mild inﬂuenza-like
illness caused by H5N1 infection (48). As with any surveillance
system, case ascertainment for H5N1 infections certainly has not
captured 100% of the cases. However, all of the data presented
above suggest that the number of mild infections that have been
missed is likely relatively small.
Up to this point, we have discussed the likelihood of missing
mild cases of H5N1 infection; however, it is also important to
considerthepotentialtomissfatalcasesofH5N1infection.Inves-
tigatorshaveshownthatcurrentcase-basedsurveillanceforH5N1
infection in countries with ongoing avian H5N1 transmission
does not always document fatal cases, with such cases being
missed either because the diagnosis was not considered or viro-
logic conﬁrmation was lacking (46, 47, 49). A more complete as-
certainment of fatal cases of H5N1 infection would increase the
current H5N1 case-fatality rate. While this is also likely an infre-
quentoccurrence,thephenomenonofmissingcasesoffatalinfec-
tious illnesses has been documented in other situations. For ex-
ample, one would expect that fatal cases of human rabies would
rarely escape detection; however, instances of previously fatal hu-
manrabiescaseshavebeenuncoveredonlyafterrecipientsoftheir
donated organs subsequently developed rabies and died (50, 51).
The available seroepidemiologic data for human H5N1 infec-
tionsupportthecurrentWHO-reportedcase-fatalityratesof30%
to 80% (16). While some have suggested that concern about such
high case-fatality estimates was a major factor in the NSABB de-
cision, such estimates were only one of a number of factors con-
sidered by the NSABB (12). In fact, if H5N1 virus does become a
pandemic virus, the virulence (as measured by the case-fatality
rate) could decrease 10- to 20-fold from what is currently docu-
mentedandtheviruswouldstillgenerateamoreseverepandemic
than the 1918 pandemic, where the overall case-fatality rate was
probably about 2%. Given the global population and the current
dynamics of population movement around the world, an H5N1
pandemic, even with a relatively low case-fatality rate, would be a
truly catastrophic event.
ROLE OF VACCINES AND ANTIVIRAL AGENTS IN
MITIGATING AN H5N1 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
The primary public health response to an inﬂuenza pandemic is a
pandemicvaccine.Secondarytothepandemicvaccineistheuseof
antivirals. If an H5N1 strain, regardless of its origin, becomes
readilytransmissiblebetweenhumansandbeginstospreadinthe
population,itlikelywillresultinaninﬂuenzapandemic.Thepro-
posal that viable vaccines and available antivirals will make a sub-
stantial difference in the global morbidity and mortality associ-
atedwiththepandemicisnotsupportedbydatafromtheprevious
three pandemics. The time required to manufacture both egg-
based and cell culture-based inﬂuenza vaccines has resulted in
“toolittle,toolate”vaccineresponsesforthe1957,1968,and2009
pandemics on a worldwide scale.
For example, by 28 October 2009, only 16.8 million doses of
pandemic2009A(H1N1)pmd09vaccinehadbeenshippedbythe
U.S. federal government to states (52). An ample supply of the
vaccinewasnotavailableuntilafterthesecondwavehadsubsided
in early October; by that time, demand for the vaccine had
dropped dramatically. The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) estimated that the 2009 A(H1N1)pdm09 pan-
demic vaccine prevented only 200 to 520 deaths in the United
States because of delay in availability (53).
Mammalian cell-based pandemic vaccines were licensed for
useintheEuropeanUnionin2009andwereusedthereduringthe
pandemic response. As in the United States, both the egg-
produced and the cell culture-produced inﬂuenza vaccines ar-
rivedtoolateandintoolittlequantitytohaveasigniﬁcantimpact
onthepandemicintheEuropeanUnion.Accordingtothedateof
marketing authorization in Europe, a mammalian cell-based vac-
cinewasavailableonlyafterthreeadjuvantedegg-basedinﬂuenza
vaccines were already in distribution (54). The European experi-
encewiththeavailabilityofapandemiccell-basedvaccinedidnot
demonstrate a measurable improvement in vaccine production
speednorwasitsufﬁcienttoaltertheoverallpublichealthimpact
of the pandemic in Europe.
Given the need to distribute pandemic vaccines globally and
the fact that not all countries have the ﬁnancial assets to purchase
sufﬁcientquantitiesofvaccinefortheirpopulationsduringapan-
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bution of pandemic inﬂuenza vaccines. As of 10 November 2010,
the last WHO update for pandemic vaccine distribution, only 78
million doses of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine had been distributed to
77 countries (55). All of these vaccine doses were distributed well
after the second wave of the pandemic, months after developed
countries had started their vaccine campaigns.
From a historical perspective, inﬂuenza vaccine also arrived in
quantitiestoosmallandtoolatetohaveasigniﬁcantpublichealth
impactintheUnitedStatesforboththe1957and1968pandemics.
Given the experience of the three previous pandemics, unless
newer and more effective inﬂuenza vaccine technologies are de-
velopedthatfacilitatesubstantiallyfasterproductionandgenerate
far greater numbers of doses in much shorter time frames, it is
unlikelythatinﬂuenzavaccinewillhaveasigniﬁcantpublichealth
impact during the next pandemic. The technology behind our
current inﬂuenza vaccines is simply not sufﬁcient to address the
complex challenges associated with an inﬂuenza pandemic in the
21st century.
Currently there are limited H5N1 inﬂuenza vaccine stockpiles
around the globe, including one in the United States. These vac-
cinesarenotdesignedtoprotectthegeneralpopulationbutareto
be targeted to a small subset of critical-asset individuals, until a
pandemic-speciﬁc vaccine can be produced. Furthermore, it is
unclearastohoweffectivethecurrentlystockpiledH5N1vaccines
wouldbeagainstanemergentpandemicstrain,giventhediversity
of existing H5N1 clades.
Antivirals are the only other pharmaceutical intervention
available for inﬂuenza. As with inﬂuenza vaccines during a pan-
demic, the global capacity for antiviral manufacturing falls far
short of global needs. While there are global and national stock-
piles of antivirals devoted to pandemic response, during the
2009–2010 pandemic, there were signiﬁcant disparities regarding
use and availability of antivirals around the world (56). Current
antiviral stockpiles and antiviral manufacturing capacity support
the conclusion that should another inﬂuenza pandemic occur in
theforeseeablefuture,theimpactofantiviraluseonhumanmor-
bidityandmortalitywillbenobetterthanwasdocumentedinthe
2009 pandemic.
SUMMARY
Insummary,webelievethatthedebateaboutthecase-fatalityrate
ofH5N1inﬂuenzainhumansandthesuggestedimportantroleof
currently available antivirals and vaccines in mitigating an H5N1
pandemic are without merit. Furthermore, we do not believe that
continuedfocusontheseissueshelpstoaddresshowbesttoman-
age research involving inﬂuenza viruses, such as H5N1, that are
transmissible between mammals and have the potential to be
highly virulent in humans. Future discussions speciﬁc to the cur-
rentcontroversyneedtoresolvecriticalquestionssuchashowwe
safelyconductH5N1virustransmissionstudiesinmammals,how
we share critical methods and results with those who have a need
to know, and how we ensure that laboratory-generated H5N1 vi-
ruses do not escape controlled environments. Resolution of these
issues with regard to H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses has the potential to
serve as a template for similar situations involved existing or
emergent pathogens. It is our belief that the current controversy
provides a valuable opportunity for scientists and public policy
experts to work together in creating this road map for the future.
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